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Abstract—The modeling of cascading failure in power systems
is difficult because of the many different mechanisms involved; no
single model captures all of these mechanisms. Understanding the
relative importance of these different mechanisms is important
for choosing which mechanisms need to be modeled for particular
applications. This work presents a dynamic simulation model of
both power networks and protection systems, which can simulate
a wider variety of cascading outage mechanisms relative to
existing quasi-steady state (QSS) models. This paper describes
the model and demonstrates how different mechanisms interact.
In order to test the model we simulated a batch of randomly
selected N − 2 contingencies for several different static load
configurations, and found that the distributions of blackout sizes
and event lengths from the simulator correlate well with historical
trends. The results also show that load models have significant
impacts on the cascading risks. Finally, the dynamic model was
compared against a simple dc-power-flow based QSS model; we
find that the two models tend to agree for the early stages of
cascading, but produce substantially different results for later
stages.
Index Terms—Cascading outages, cascading failures, power
system dynamic simulation, differential algebraic equation,
power system modeling, power system protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE vital significance of studying cascading outageshas been recognized in both the power industry and
academia [1]–[3]. However, since electrical power networks
are very large and complex systems [4], understanding the
many mechanisms by which cascading outages propagate is
challenging. This paper presents the design of and results from
a new non-linear dynamic model of cascading failure in power
systems (the Cascading Outage Simulator with Multiprocess
Integration Capabilities or COSMIC), which can be used to
study a wide variety of different mechanisms of cascading
outages.
A variety of cascading failure modeling approaches have
been reported in the research literature, many of which are
reviewed in [1]–[3]. Several have used quasi-steady state
(QSS) dc power flow models [5]–[7], which are numerically
robust and can describe cascading overloads. However, they
do not capture non-linear mechanisms like voltage collapse or
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dynamic instability. QSS ac power flow models have been used
to model cascading failures in [8]–[11], but these models still
require difficult assumptions to model machine dynamics and
to deal with non-convergent power flows. Some have proposed
models that combine the dc approximations and dynamic
models [12], allowing for more accurate modeling of under-
voltage and under-frequency load shedding. These methods
increase the modeling fidelity over pure dc models but still
neglect voltage collapse. Others developed statistical models
that use data from simulations [13], [14] or historical cascades
[15] to represent the general features of cascading. Statistical
models are useful, but cannot replace detailed simulations to
understand particular cascading mechanisms in depth. There
are also topological models [16]–[19] which have been applied
to the identification of vulnerable/critical elements, however,
without detailed power grid information, the results that they
yield differ greatly and could result in misleading conclusions
about the grid vulnerability [20].
Some dynamic models [21], [22] and numerical techniques
[23], [24] study the mid/long-term dynamics of power system
behavior, and show that mid/long term stability is an important
part of cascading outage mechanisms. However, concurrent
modeling of power system dynamics and discrete protection
events—such as line tripping by over-current, distance and
temperature relays, under-voltage and under-frequency load
shedding—is challenging and not considered in most existing
models. In [25] the authors describe an initial approach using
a system of differential-algebraic equations with an additional
set of discrete equations to dynamically model cascading
failures.
The paper describes the details of and results from a new
non-linear dynamic model of cascading failure in power sys-
tems, which we call “Cascading Outage Simulator with Mul-
tiprocess Integration Capabilities” (COSMIC). In COSMIC,
dynamic components, such as rotating machines, exciters, and
governors, are modeled using differential equations. The asso-
ciated power flows are represented using non-linear power flow
equations. Load voltage responses are explicitly represented,
and discrete changes (e.g., components failures, load shedding)
are described by a set of equations that indicate the proximity
to thresholds that trigger discrete changes. Given dynamic data
for a power system and a set of exogenous disturbances that
may trigger a cascade, COSMIC uses a recursive process to
compute the impact of the triggering event(s) by solving the
differential-algebraic equations (DAEs) while monitoring for
discrete events, including events that subdivide the network
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2into islands.
There are only a few existing commercial and research-
grade simulation tools that specifically address cascading
failure events and their consequences [2]. Static modeling
is still dominant in these tools, although at least two com-
mercial packages (Eurostag ASSESS [26] and POM-PCM
[27]) have introduced dynamic simulation to their cascading
failure analysis. The model that we propose here supplements
these commercial tools by providing an open platform for
research and development that allows one to explicitly test
the impact of the many assumptions that are necessary for
dynamic cascading failure modeling. For example, users can
modify the existing system components, add new ones, and
integrate advanced remedial control actions. Additionally, the
dynamic/adaptive time step and recursive islanded time hori-
zons (see Section II-C) implemented in this simulator allow
for faster computations during, or near, steady-state regimes,
and fine resolution during transient phases. Moreover, this tool
can be easily integrated with High Performance Computing
(HPC) clusters to run many simulations simultaneously at a
much lower cost, relative to commercial tools.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II
introduces the components of the model mathematically and
describes how different modules interact. In Section III, we
present results from several experimental validation studies.
Section IV presents our conclusions from this study. Finally,
Section V provides further details on the model and its settings.
II. HYBRID SYSTEM MODELING IN COSMIC
A. Hybrid differential-algebraic formulation
Dynamic power networks are typically modeled as sets of
DAEs [28]. If one also considers the dynamics resulting from
discrete changes such as those caused by protective relays, an
additional set of discrete equations is added, which results in
a hybrid DAE system [29].
Let us assume that the state of the power system at time t
can be defined by three vectors: x(t), y(t), and z(t), where:
x is a vector of continuous state variables that change
with time according to a set of differential equations
dx
dt
= f(t,x(t),y(t), z(t)) (1)
y is a vector of continuous state variables that have
pure algebraic relationships to other variables in the
system:
g(t,x(t),y(t), z(t)) = 0 (2)
z is a vector of state variables that can only take integer
states (zi ∈ [0, 1])
h(t,x(t),y(t), z(t)) < 0 (3)
When constraint hi(...) < 0 fails, an associated counter
function di (see II-B) activates. Each zi changes state if di
reaches its limit.
The set of differential equations (1) represent the machine
dynamics (and/or load dynamics if dynamic load models are
included). In COSMIC the differential equations include a
third order machine model and somewhat simplified gover-
nor and exciter models in order to improve computational
efficiency without compromising the fundamental functions
of those components (see Section V-A for more details).
In particular, the governor is rate and rail limited to model
the practical constraints of generator power control systems.
The governor model incorporates both droop control and
integral control, which is important to mid/long term stability
modeling, especially in isolated systems [28].
The algebraic constraints (2) encapsulate the standard ac
power flow equations. In this study we implemented both
polar and rectangular power flow formulations. Load models
are an important part of the algebraic equations, which are
particularly critical components of cascading failure simulation
because i) they need to represent the aggregated dynamics of
many complicated devices and ii) they can dramatically change
system dynamics. The baseline load model in COSMIC is a
static model, which can be configured as constant power (P ),
constant current (I), constant impedance (Z), exponential (E),
or any combination thereof (ZIPE) [30].
As Fig. 1 illustrates, load models can have a dramatic
impact on algebraic convergence. Constant power loads are
particularly difficult to model for the off-nominal condition.
Numerical failures are much less common with constant I or
Z loads, but are not accurate representations of many loads.
This motivated us to include the exponential component in
COSMIC.
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Fig. 1. Bus voltage responses to two line outages (5-7 and 6-9) in the
IEEE 9-bus for the baseline load types in the COSMIC model. The system
separates into two islands after the initial events (t = 1 second). The non-
converged network is declared as blacked-out area in which all the algebraic
and differential variables are not available anymore (see bottom left and right
panels for the P and E load models as examples of this behavior).
During cascading failures, power systems undergo many
discrete changes that are caused by exogenous events (e.g.,
manual operations, weather) and endogenous events (e.g.,
automatic protective relay actions). The discrete event(s) will
consequently change algebraic equations and the systems dy-
namic response, which may result in cascading failures, system
islanding, and large blackouts. In COSMIC, the endogenous
3responses of a power network to stresses are represented by
(3). These discrete responses are described in detail in II-B
and II-C.
B. Relay modeling
Major disturbances cause system oscillations as the system
seeks a new equilibrium. These oscillations may naturally die
out due to the interactions of system inertia, damping, and
exciter and governor controls. In order to ensure that relays
do not trip due to brief transient state changes, time-delays are
added to each protective relay in COSMIC.
We implemented in this model two types of time-delayed
triggering algorithms: fixed-time delay and time-inverse de-
lay. These two delay algorithms are modeled by a counter
function, d, which is triggered by (3). The fixed-time delay
triggering activates its counter/timer as soon as the monitored
signal exceeds its threshold. If the signal remains beyond the
threshold, this timer will continue to count down from a preset
value until it runs out then the associated relay takes actions.
Similarly, the timer will recover if the signal is within the
threshold and will max out at the preset value. For the time-
inverse delay algorithm, instead of counting for the increment
of time beyond (or within) the threshold, we evaluate the area
over (or under) the threshold by integration (based on Euler’s
rule).
Five types of protective relays are modeled in COSMIC:
over-current (OC) relays, distance (DIST) relays, and temper-
ature (TEMP) relays for transmission line protection; as well
as under-voltage load shedding (UVLS) and under-frequency
load shedding (UFLS) relays for stress mitigation. OC relays
monitor the instantaneous current flow along each branch.
DIST relays represent a Zone 1 relay that monitors the
apparent admittance of the transmission line. TEMP relays
monitor the line temperature, which is obtained from a first
order differential equation
T˙i = riF
2
i − kiTi (4)
where Ti is the temperature difference relative to the ambient
temperature (20 ◦C) for line i, Fi is the current flow of line
i, ri and ki are the are heating and time constants for line i
[12]. ri and ki are chosen so that line i’s temperature reaches
75 ◦C (ACSR conductors) if current flow hits the rate-A limit,
and its TEMP relay triggers in 60 seconds when current flow
jumps from rate-A to rate-C. The threshold for each TEMP
relay is obtained from the rate-B limit. While it would have
been possible to incorporate the temperature relays into the
trapezoidal integration used for the other differential equations,
these variables are much slower than the other differential
variables in x. Instead, we computed Ti outside of the primary
integration system using Euler’s rule.
When voltage magnitude or frequency signals at load Bus
i are lower than the specified thresholds, the UVLS relay or
UFLS relay will shed a 25% (default setting) of the initial
Pd,i to avoid the onset of voltage instability and reduce
system stress. In order to monitor frequency at each load bus,
Dijkstra’s algorithm [31] and electrical distances [32] were
used to find the generator (and thus frequency from x) that is
most proximate to each load bus. Both the UVLS and UFLS
relays used a fixed-time delay of 0.5 seconds.
C. Solving the hybrid DAE
Because of its numerical stability advantages, COSMIC uses
the trapezoidal rule [33] to simultaneously integrate and solve
the differential and algebraic equations (see Section V-B for
more details).
Whereas many of the common tools in the literature [34],
[35] use a fixed time step-size, COSMIC implements a variable
time step-size in order to trade-off between the diverse time-
scales of the dynamics that we implement. We select small
step sizes during transition periods that have high deviation or
oscillations in order to keep the numerical within tolerance; the
step sizes increase as the oscillations dampen toward steady-
state values.
When a discrete event occurs at td, the complete represen-
tation of the system is provided in the following equations:
0 = x+
td − t
2
[f(t) + f(td,xd,yd, z)] (5)
0 = g(td,x+,y+, z) (6)
0 > h(td,x+,y+) (7)
0 = d(td,x+,y+) (8)
where, t is the previous time point, and d is the counter
function mentioned previously. Because of the adaptive step-
size, COSMIC retains td from td = t+ ∆td, in which ∆td is
found by linear interpolation of two time steps.
Every time a discrete event happens (h < 0 and d = 0),
COSMIC stops solving the DAE for the previous network
configuration, processes the discrete event(s), then resumes the
DAE solver using the updated initial condition. Specifically, it
uses updated algebraic variables while holding the differential
variables. In some cases the discrete event causes the system to
split into multiple islands. COSMIC checks for this condition
by inspection of the network admittance matrix (Ybus) (see
Algorithm 1). COSMIC deals with the separation of a power
network into sub-networks (unintentional islanding) using a
recursive process that is described in Algorithm 1. If islanding
results from a discrete event, the present hybrid DAE separates
into two sets of DAEs. COSMIC treats the two sub-networks
the same way as the original one, integrates and solves these
two DAE systems in parallel, and synchronizes two result sets
in the end.
One can find the relevant parametric settings for the numer-
ical integration and protective relays in Table VI and Table
VII (Section V-C).
D. Validation
To validate COSMIC, we compared the dynamic response in
COSMIC against commercial software—PowerWorld [35]—
using the classic 9-bus test case [36]. From a random con-
tingency simulation, the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) be-
tween the results produced by COSMIC and PowerWorld was
within 0.11%. Since COSMIC adopted simplified exciter and
governor models that are not included in many commercial
4Algorithm 1 Time-Domain Simulation Algorithm
procedure
Step 1: Build and initialize the hybrid DAE system for the
given power network.
Step 2: Process the exogenous contingencies if they exist.
Step 3: Check for network separation by inspecting the
updated Ybus.
if Yes, then
Divide the current system into two sub-networks.
Recursively launch a time-domain simulation for
each of the two sub-networks, starting at Step 1.
Step 4:
if the network configuration changed, then
Recompute the Ybus; re-solve the algebraic system
g(x, y, z) = 0 to find the new y.
Step 5: Integrate the continuous DAE system until one of
two conditions occur: (a) the simulation reaches its pre-
specified end time (t = tmax), or (b) one of the discrete
thresholds is crossed (h < 0).
Step 6: Check for discrete events (Condition (b) in Step 5).
if Yes, then
Identify the time point at which the discrete event(s)
occurred (hi ≤ 0 and di = 0).
Find the values for differential variables, x, and
algebraic variables, y, at the above time point using linear
interpolation between time steps.
Process the discrete events by changing relay status
(zi) according to hi.
Go back to Step 3.
else
Go back to Step 5.
Step 7: Merge the time-series data from this sub-graph
upstream with the rest of the system until reaching the top-
level and then save the aggregate.
packages, several of the time constants were set to zero or
very close to zero in order to obtain agreement between the
two models.
III. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we present the results from several com-
putational experiments, which illustrate this model and the
types of insight that one can gain with dynamic cascading
failure simulation. Three test systems are used: the 9-bus
system [36], the 39-bus system, and the 2383-bus system
[37], which is an equivalenced system based on the year 2000
winter snapshot for the Polish network. Section III-A compares
the computational efficiency of the polar and rectangular
formulations of the model. Section III-B uses the 9-bus test
case to illustrate the different relay functions and their time
delay algorithms. Section III-C demonstrates how COSMIC
processes cascading events such as line branch outages, load
shedding, and islanding. Section III-D studies the impact
of different load modeling assumptions on cascading failure
sizes. Finally, Section III-E compares results from COSMIC
with results from a dc-power flow based model of cascading
failure in order to understand similarities and differences
between these two different modeling approaches.
A. Polar formulation vs. rectangular formulation in computa-
tional efficiency
COSMIC includes both polar and rectangular power flow
formulations. In order to compare the computational efficiency
of the two formulations, we conducted a number of N − 1
and N − 2 experiments using two different cases, the 39-bus
and 2383-bus systems. The amount of time that a simulation
requires and the number of linear solves (Ax = b) are
two measures commonly used to evaluate the computational
efficiency of a model. Compared to the first metric, the number
of linear solves describes computational speed independently
of specific computing hardware, and it is adopted in this study.
Tables I and II compare the two formulations with respect
to the number of linear solves. These comparisons are grouped
by the amount of demand lost in each simulation, given that
longer cascades tend to require more linear solves and have
different numerical properties. For the 39-bus case, 45 N − 1
experiments and 222 randomly selected N − 2 experiments
were conducted, and each of them finished at 50 seconds
and lost the same amount of power demand. As shown in
Table I, the performances of the two methods were similar
in terms of number of linear solves; however, the rectangular
formulation required fewer linear solves and shows various
improvements (e.g., positive decrease rectangular vs. polar)
for different demand losses.
For the 2383-bus test case, we simulated 2494 N−1 and 556
N −2 contingencies; Table II shows the results. There was no
significant improvement for the rectangular formulation over
the polar formulation, and the number of linear solves that
resulted from both forms were almost identical.
One can also notice that solving the 2383-bus case required
fewer linear solves than for the 39-bus case. This suggests
that some branch outages have a higher impact on a smaller
network and cause more dynamic oscillations than on a larger
network such as the 2383-bus case.
B. Relay event illustration
To depict the functionality of how protective relays integrate
with COSMIC’s time delay features, we implemented the
following example using the 9-bus system. The initial event
was a single-line outage from Bus 6 to Bus 9 at t = 10
seconds. The count-down timer of the DIST relay for branch 5-
7 was activated with a tpreset-delay = 0.5 seconds. As shown
in Fig. 2, the system underwent a transient swing following
the one-line outage. Right after 0.5 seconds, tdelay ran out
(P1) and branch 5-7 was tripped by its DIST relay, which
resulted in two isolated islands. Meanwhile, the thresholds
for UVLS relays were set to 0.92 pu. Note that the magenta
voltage trace violated this voltage limit at about t = 10.2
seconds (P2). Because this trace continued under the limit after
that, its UVLS timer counted down from tpreset-delay = 0.5
seconds till t = 10.7 seconds (P3), where its UVLS relay
took action and shed 25% of the initial load at this bus. The
adjacent yellow trace illustrates that the UVLS relay timer was
5TABLE I
THE NUMBER OF LINEAR SOLVES FOR THE 39-BUS CASE.
0-1 1-200 200-500 500-1000 1000-3000 3000-6000
MW MW MW MW MW MW
Polar1 3084 6839 10523 5994 41067 10278
Rec.1 3035 6724 10324 5846 4052 9501
Tests2 176 38 14 32 4 3
% Dec.3 1.59% 1.69% 1.89% 2.46% 1.33% 7.6%
1: The density (non-zero rates) of the Jacobian matrices for polar and
rectangular forms are 0.0376% and 0.0383% respectively; 2: the number of
tests; 3: The percentage decrease in the number of linear solves, rectangular
vs. polar.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF LINEAR SOLVES FOR THE 2383-BUS CASE.
0-1 MW 1-2000 MW
Polar4 867.77 692.81
Rec.4 867.84 693.10
Tests 2494 556
% Dec. -0.009% -0.04%
4: The density (non-zero rates) of the Jacobian matrices for polar and
rectangular formulations are 0.000856% and 0.000872% respectively.
activated as well but with a small lag. This UVLS relay never
got triggered because before its tdelay emptied out the load
shedding at P2 put this yellow trace back upon threshold, and
its tdelay was restored to 0.5 seconds.
Fig. 2. The bus voltage magnitudes when the branch from Bus 6 to Bus 9 in
the 9-bus system is tripped. DIST relay and UVLS relay actions are illustrated.
The dashed black line is the the voltage threshold for UVLS relays.
C. Cascading outage examples using the 39-bus and the 2383-
bus power systems
The following experiment demonstrates a cascading outage
example using the IEEE 39-bus case (see Table III for a sum-
mary of the sequential events). The system suffered a strong
dynamic oscillation after the initial two exogenous events
(branches 2-25 and 5-6). After approximately 55 seconds the
first OC relay at branch 4-5 triggered. Because the monitored
current kept up-crossing and down-crossing its limit, it delayed
the relay triggering based on the time delay algorithms for the
protection devices. Load shedding at two buses (Bus 7 and
Bus 8) occurred around t = 55.06 seconds, then another two
branches (10-13 and 13-14) shut down after OC relay trips
at t = 55.28 seconds. These events separated the system into
two islands. At t = 55.78 seconds, two branches (3-4 and 17-
18) were taken off the grid and this resulted in another island.
The system eventually ended up with three isolated networks.
However, one of them was not algebraically solvable due to a
dramatic power imbalance, and it was declared as a blackout
area.
Fig. 3. The sequence of events for an illustrative cascading failure in the
2383-bus network. Numbers show the locations and sequence of line outages.
Number 0 with black highlights denotes the two initial events. Other sequential
numbers indicate the rest of the branch outages. In this example, 24 branches
are off-line and causes a small island (the blue colored network) in the
end. The dots with additional red square indicate buses where load shedding
happens.
TABLE III
39-BUS CASE CASCADING OUTAGE EXAMPLE.
No. Time (sec) Events
1 3 Initial events: branches 2-25 and 5-6 trip
2 54.78 Branch 6-7 is tripped by OC relay
3 55.06 58.45 MW load shedding at Bus 7
4 55.07 130.50 MW load shedding at Bus 8
5 55.28 Branch 4-14 is tripped by OC relay
6 55.28 Branch 10-13 is tripped by OC relay
7 55.28 Branch 13-14 is tripped by OC relay
— 55.28 1st islanding event
8 55.78 Branch 3-4 is tripped by OC relay
9 55.78 Branch 17-18 is tripped by OC relay
— 55.78 2nd islanding event
Fig. 3 illustrates a sequence of branch outage events using
the 2383-bus network. This cascading was initiated by two
exogenous branch outages (Branches 31-32 and 388-518,
which are marked as number 0 in Fig. 3) and resulted in a
total of 92 discrete events. Out of these, 24 were branch outage
events, and they are labeled in order in Fig. 3. These events
consequently caused a small island (light blue colored dots).
The dots with additional red square highlighting indicate buses
6Fig. 4. The top panel shows the timeline of all branch outage events listed in Fig. 3, and the lower panel zooms in the associated load-shedding events.
where load shedding occurred. From this figure we can see
that cascading sequences do not follow an easily predictable
pattern, and the affected buses with low voltage or frequency
may be far from the initiating events.
The top panel in Fig. 4 shows the timeline of all branch
outage events for the above cascading scenario, and the lower
panel zooms in the load-shedding events. In the early phase
of this cascading outages, the occurrence of the components
failed relatively slowly, however, it speeded up as the number
of failures increased. Eventually the system condition was
substantially compromised, which caused fast collapse and the
majority of the branch outages as well as the load shedding
events (see lower panel in Fig. 4).
D. N − 2 contingency analysis using the 2383-bus case
Power systems are operated to ensure the N − 1 security
criterion so that any single component failure will not cause
subsequent contingencies [38]. The modified 2383-bus system
that we are studying in this paper satisfies this criterion for
transmission line outages. Thus, we assume here that branch
outages capture a wide variety of exogenous contingencies that
initiate cascades, for example a transformer tripping due to a
generator failure.
The experiment implemented here included four groups of
1200 randomly selected N −2 contingencies for the 2383-bus
system. We measured the size of the resulting cascades using
the number of relay events and the amount of demand lost.
Each group had a different static load configuration. The load
configuration for the first group was 100% constant Z load; the
second group used 100% E load; the third had 100% constant
P load; and the fourth one included 25% of each portion in the
ZIPE model. We set TEMP, DIST, UVLS, and UFLS relays
active in this experiment and deactivated OC relay due to its
overlapping/similar function with TEMP relay.
Fig. 5 shows the Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Function (CCDF) of demand losses for these four groups
of simulations. The CCDF plots of demand losses exhibit
a heavy-tailed blackout size distribution, which are typically
found in both historical blackout data and cascading failure
models [39]. The magenta trace indicates constant Z load, and
shows the best performance –in terms of the average power
loss and the probability of large blackout– within this set of
1200 random N − 2 contingencies (listed in Table IV). In
contrast, the blue trace (constant E load) reveals the highest
risk of large size blackouts (> 1000 MW). The constant P
load has a similar trend as the constant E load, due to their
similar stiff characteristics; however, the constant E load with
this particular exponent, 0.08, demonstrates a negative effect
on the loss of load. The one with 25% Z, 25% I, 25% P
and 25% of E performs in the middle of constant P load and
constant Z load.
As can be seen in Table IV, the probabilities of large
demand losses varies from 2.5% to 3.5% for those four
load configurations. These results show that load models play
an important role in dynamic simulation and may increase
the frequency of non-convergence if they are not properly
modeled.
TABLE IV
THE AVERAGE DEMAND LOSS, AVERAGE BRANCH OUTAGES AND THE
PROBABILITIES OF LOSS OF THE WHOLE SYSTEM FOR DIFFERENT LOAD
MODELS.
Load Model Avg. Loss Avg. BO1 Prob. of Largest Loss
Z100 644.19 MW 0.2092 0.025
E100 889.02 MW 0.1800 0.035
P100 848.21 MW 0.1775 0.033
Z25I25P25E25 807.11 MW 0.2042 0.032
1: BO — branch outages.
Fig. 7 shows the CCDF plots of total dependent event
length, including all event types after the initial contingencies,
such as branch outages caused by TEMP and DIST relays,
and load shedding events by UVLS and UFLS relays. Fig. 8
shows the CCDF of the branch outage lengths only. We can see
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from these two figures that the distributions of constant P and
constant E loads have a comparable pattern, and they are in
general less likely to have the same amount of branch outages,
relative to the other two configurations. In Fig. 6 we compare
the amount of load shedding in the 88 simulated cascades to
the number of discrete events (including the two exogenous
line outages), the total number of events, and the cascading
time. Each of these 88 samples includes at least one dependent
event (31 of the 1200 simulations did not converge and were
declared as full blackouts, and 1081 of them were resilient
cases without any dependent events). The results show that
there is a positive, but weak, correlation between the number
of events and the blackout size in MW. We also find that there
is a positive, but weak, correlation between cascading failure
size in MW and the length of the cascade in seconds.
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Fig. 7. CCDF of event length for 1200 randomly selected N−2 contingencies
using the 2383-bus case.
E. Comparison with a dc cascading outage simulator
A number of authors have implemented quasi-steady state
(QSS) models using the dc power flow equations to investigate
cascading outages [5]–[7]. The dc model includes numerous
simplifications that are substantially different from the “real”
system. However, the dc model is numerically stable, making
it possible to produce results that can be statistically similar
to data from real power systems [40]. On the other hand,
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Fig. 8. CCDF of event length (branch outages only) for 1200 randomly
selected N − 2 contingencies using the 2383-bus case.
dynamic models, such as the one presented here, include
many mechanisms of cascading that cannot be represented
in the dc model. In order to understand the implications of
these differences, we conducted two experiments to compare
COSMIC with the dc QSS model described in [5] with
respect to the overall probabilities of demand losses and
the extent to which the patterns of cascading from the two
models agree. These experiments provide helpful insights into
the dominant cascading mechanisms in different phases of
cascading sequences, and into the conditions under which one
would want to use a dynamic model as opposed to a simpler
model.
1) The probabilities of demand losses: For the first ex-
periment, we computed the CCDF of demand losses in both
COSMIC (with the constant impedance load model) and the
dc model using the same 1200 branch outage pairs from III-D.
From Fig. 9 one can learn that the probability of demand losses
in the dc simulator is lower than that of COSMIC for the same
amount of demand losses. In particular, the largest demand
loss in dc simulator is much smaller than in COSMIC (2639
MW vs. 24602 MW, with probabilities 0.08% vs. 2.5%). This
large difference between them is not surprising because the
dc model is much more stable and does not run into problems
of numerical non-convergence. Also, the protection algorithms
differ somewhat between the two models. In addition, some
of the contingencies do produce large blackouts in the dc
simulator, which causes the fat tail that can be seen in Fig. 9.
Numerical failures in solving the DAE system greatly
contributed to the larger blackout sizes observed in COSMIC,
because COSMIC assumes that the network or sub-network in
which the numerical failure occurred experienced a complete
blackout. This illustrates a tradeoff that comes with using
detailed non-linear dynamic models: while the component
models are more accurate, the many assumptions that are
needed substantially impact the outcomes, potentially in ways
that are not fully accurate.
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Fig. 9. CCDF of demand losses for COSMIC with constant impedance load
and the dc cascading outage simulator, for 1200 randomly selected N − 2
contingencies using the 2383-bus case.
TABLE V
THE STATISTICAL RESULTS FOR THE COMPARISON BETWEEN COSMIC
AND DC SIMULATOR.
336 critical pairs
COSMIC dc simulator
Avg. Demand Loss 23873 MW 3039.5 MW
Avg. Branch Outage Length 7.5476 26.7351
Avg. R 0.1948
Std. Dev. of R 0.1381
Max R 0.6
Avg. R (first 10)1 0.3487
Std. Dev. of R (first 10) 0.2445
Max R (first 10) 1
1: only the first 10 branch outages.
It is possible that this result may be affected to some extent
by the size of the sample set. The 1200 randomly selected
contingency pairs represent 0.0278% of the total N−2 branch
outage pairs. Extensive investigation of how different sampling
approaches might impact the observed statistics remains for
future work.
2) Path Agreement Measurement: The second comparison
experiment was to study the patterns of cascading between
these two models. This comparison provides additional insight
into the impact of dynamics on cascade propagation patterns.
In order to do so, we compared the sets of transmission
lines that failed using the “Path Agreement Measure” intro-
duced in (9) [12]. The relative agreement of cascade paths,
R(m1,m2), is defined as follows. If models m1 and m2 are
both subjected to the same set of exogenous contingencies:
C = {c1, c2, c3, .....}. R(m1,m2) measures the average agree-
ment in the set of dependent events that result from each
contingency in each model. If contingency ci results in the
set Ai of dependent branch failures in model m1 and the set
Bi of dependent branch failures in m2, R(m1,m2) is defined
9as:
R(m1,m2) =
1
C
|C|∑
i=1
|Ai ∩Bi|
|Ai ∪Bi| (9)
The experiment measured R(m1,m2) between COSMIC
(with a Z25I25P25E25 load configuration) and the dc simulator
for 336 critical branch outage pairs. These branch outage
pairs are the ones reported in [5] to produce large cascading
blackouts. Table V shows that the average R between the
two models for the whole set of sequences is 0.1948, which
is relatively low. This indicates that there are substantial
differences between cascade paths in the two models. Part
of the reason is that the dc model tends to produce longer
cascades and consequently increase the denominator in (9).
In order to control this, we computed R only for the first 10
branch outage events. The average R increased to 0.3487, and
some of the cascading paths showed a perfect match (R = 1).
This suggests that the cascading paths resulting from the two
models tend to agree during the early stages of cascading,
when non-linear dynamics are less pronounced, but disagree
during later stages.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes a method for and results from sim-
ulating cascading failures in power systems using full non-
linear dynamic models. The new model, COSMIC, represents
a power system as a set of hybrid discrete/continuous dif-
ferential algebraic equations, simultaneously simulating pro-
tection systems and machine dynamics. Several experiments
illustrated the various components of COSMIC and provided
important general insights regarding the modeling of cascading
failure in power systems. By simulating 1200 randomly chosen
N − 2 contingencies for a 2383-bus test case, we found that
COSMIC produces heavy-tailed blackout size distributions,
which are typically found in both historical blackout data
and cascading failure models [39]. However, the relative
frequency of very large events may be exaggerated in dynamic
model due to numerical non-convergence (about 3% of cases).
More importantly, the blackout size results show that load
models can substantially impact cascade sizes—cases that
used constant impedance loads showed consistently smaller
blackouts, relative to constant current, power or exponential
models. In addition, the contingency simulation results from
COSMIC were compared to corresponding simulations from
a dc power flow based quasi-steady-state cascading failure
simulator, using a new metric. The two models largely agreed
for the initial periods of cascading (for about 10 events), then
diverged for later stages where dynamic phenomena drive the
sequence of events.
Together these results illustrate that detailed dynamic mod-
els of cascading failure can be useful in understanding the
relative importance of various features of these models. The
particular model used in this paper, COSMIC, is likely too
slow for many large-scale statistical analyses, but comparing
detailed models to simpler ones can be helpful in understand-
ing the relative importance of various modeling assumptions
that are necessary to understand complicated phenomena such
as cascading.
V. APPENDIX
Section V-A presents the detailed dynamic component mod-
els in COSMIC, to further explain the dynamic equations
(in Section II). Section V-B explains the formulation of
the numerical solver in this model to solve the continuous
integration. Section V-C shows the relevant settings for the
numerical solver and protective relays in COSMIC. This is free
open source code with a GNU General Public License and is
available for download and contributions in a web repository
[41].
A. Differential equations in dynamic power system
The following differential equations are used to represent
machine dynamics in COSMIC, based on the polar formula-
tion.
1) Equation for rotor speed — Swing Equation: The rotor
speed related to bus i is represented in the standard second
order swing equation [28], which describes the rotational dy-
namics of a synchronous machine. The normalized rotor speed
ω is fixed during the normal operation, and will accelerate or
decelerate when there’s disturbance.
M
dωi
dt
= Pm,i − Pg,i −D (ωi − 1) (10)
where ∀i ∈ NG (NG is the set of all generator buses), M is
a machine inertia constant, D is a damping constant, Pm,i is
the mechanical power input, and Pg,i is the generator power
output.
2) Equation for rotor angle: The rotor angle, δi, is the
integral of the relative rotor speed change with respect to
synchronous speed (1.0 in per unit notation). It is given by
the equation:
dδi(t)
dt
= 2pif0 (ωi − 1) (11)
3) Generator: The salient-pole model is adapted in COS-
MIC. The active and reactive power outputs are given by the
nonlinear equations [42]:
Pg,i =
∣∣E′a,i∣∣ |Vi|
X ′d,i
sin δm,i +
|Vi|2
2
(
1
Xq,i
− 1
X ′d,i
)
sin 2δm,i
(12)
Qg,i =
∣∣E′a,i∣∣ |Vi|
X ′d,i
cos δm,i + |Vi|2
(
cos2 δm,i
X ′d,i
+
sin2 δm,i
Xq,i
)
(13)
where ∀i ∈ NG, Xd,i and X ′d,i are the direct axis gener-
ator synchronous and transient reactances, respectively. The
transient open circuit voltage magnitude [42], |E′a,i(t)|, is
determined by the differential equation:
d
∣∣∣E′a,i(t)∣∣∣
dt
= −
∣∣∣E′a,i∣∣∣ Xd,iT ′do,iX ′d,i+(
Xd,i
X
′
d,i
− 1
)
|Vi(t)|
T
′
do,i
cos (δm,i(t)) +
Efd,i
T
′
do,i
(14)
where Tdo,i is the direct axis transient time constant, and
Efd,i is the machine exciter output. This equation, along
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with Eqs. 10-11, describe the basic physical properties of the
generation machine, which results in a third order differential
equation system.
4) Exciter: The machine exciter control in COSMIC uti-
lizes a generic model, which is a second order differential
system:
d |Efd|
dt
=
1
TE
{
KE · sigm
[(
1− TA
TB
)
E1+
TA
TB
(Vref − Vt)
]
− Efd
} (15)
d |E1|
dt
=
1
TB
(Vref − Vt − E1) (16)
where Vref is the desired reference voltage, Vt is the actual
terminal voltage, TA, TB and KE are the exciter time con-
stants, and sigm(·) is a differentiable sigmoidal function that
acts as a limiter between Emin and Emax. Fig. 10 illustrates the
simplified exciter configuration.
Fig. 10. The generic exciter model used in COSMIC
Fig. 11. Governor model used in COSMIC
5) Governor: The machine governor controls the mechan-
ical forcing given a deviation in the machine speed. COS-
MIC adapts a governor model that includes both proportional
(droop) control and an approximate representation of sec-
ondary (integral) control in order to ensure that the system
can restore frequency deviations to zero. It can be described
by Eqs. (17)-(18):
dPm
dt
= sigm
{
1
Tt
[
sigm
(
Pref −
(
1
R
∆ω + P3
))
− Pm
]}
(17)
dP3
dt
=
1
R · Ti∆ω (18)
where R, Ti and Tt are the droop, PI time constants and
servo-motor time constants, respectively. P3 is a intermediate
differential variable in the PI controller. Fig. 11 illustrates the
interactions among the governor variables.
B. Trapezoidal method to solve DAE system
Let t be the current time step, and t + ∆t be the next
time step. Assuming that we have a consistent set of variables
x =x(t),y =y(t),and z =z(t) for the current time t, f(t) and
g(t) can be calculated from them. The trapezoidal solution
method solves the following non-linear system to obtain
x+ = x(t+ ∆t) and y+ = y(t+ ∆t):
x+ = x+
∆t
2
[f(t) + f(t+,x+,y+, z)] (19)
0 = g(t+,x+,y+, z) (20)
C. The relevant settings in COSMIC for this study
Table VI and Table VII list the parameters that are used in
the numerical solution, as well as the protective relay settings
in COSMIC, respectively.
TABLE VI
THE PARAMETERS FOR THE NUMERICAL SOLVER IN COSMIC
Item Setting 1 Setting 2
Convergence Tolerance 10−9 —
Maximum Number of Iterations 20 —
Settings1 to Increase ∆t 2 ·∆tprev 0.01 [mismatch]
Settings2 to Decrease ∆t 1/2 ·∆tprev 0.05 [mismatch]
Maximum ∆t 1 sec. —
Minimum ∆t 0.005 sec. —
1: If Max(mismatch) < 0.01, increase ∆tnext to 2 ·∆tprev, except when a
discrete event occurs. 2: If Max(mismatch) > 0.05, reduce ∆tnext to
1/2 ·∆tprev, except when a discrete event occurs.
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